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RESTRICTIONS ON POLITICAL ACTIVITIES
OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
I. INTRODUCTION
The constitutionally protected freedoms of speech, association, and assembly
are recognized as fundamental to citizens in our society. Yet there are numerous
statutory abridgments of these fundamental freedoms which apply when a person
accepts employment financed primarily from government funds.
This Note will review the basic rationale for regulating employee political
activity, the nature of these restrictions, and their judicial enforcement. The Note
will also discuss the divergent trends of the last decade. Legislative bodies have
generally loosened restrictions on political activity. Nevertheless, stringent limita-
tions have been upheld through judicial decisions. The continued viability of political
restrictions is questioned as being inconsistent with evolving concepts of first amend-
ment freedoms.
II. HISTORY OF STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS
A. Historical Background
Although political parties played only a minimal role in the very early years
of our republic, by the early nineteenth century political patronage had caused many
federal employees to be chosen through the spoils system.' President Thomas
Jefferson issued an executive order which expressed dissatisfaction with political
activities by government officials and asserted the expectation that such officials
would refrain from electioneering. 2 Needless to say, Jefferson's order of 1801 did
not put an end to the spoils system in the federal government. Similar, and equally
ineffective, orders were issued under the administrations of Harrison (1841), Grant
(1873), and Hayes (1877).'
A more significant blow to the spoils system was struck by the passage of the
Civil Service Act (also known as the Pendleton Act) in 1883.1 The Civil Service
Act primarily addressed the process by which government positions were filled,
but it also restricted certain activities such as solicitations and political assessments.'
Three years later, in 1886, President Cleveland's executive order again warned federal
officials of the evils of political activities. 6 It was former Civil Service Commis-
sioner Theodore Roosevelt who issued an executive order in 1907 that later became
' Vaughn, Restrictions on the Political Activities of Public Employees: The Hatch Act and Beyond,
44 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 516, 517 (1976).
2 Id.
Friedman & Klinger, The Hatch Act: Regulation by Administrative Action of Political Activities
of Governmental Employees (pt. 2), 7 FED. B.J. 5, 7 (1945).
Civil Service Act of 1883, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403.
Id. at 406.
6 Friedman & Klinger, supra note 3, at 7.
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Civil Service Rule I and remained in effect until the passage of the Hatch Act7
in 1939:
No person in the executive civil service shall use his official authority or influence
for the purpose of interfering with an election or affecting the results thereof. Per-
sons who by the provisions of these rules are in the competition [sic] classified
service, while retaining the right to vote as they please and to express privately
their opinions on political subjects shall take no active part in political manage-
ment or in political campaigns.8
Thus, from the earliest days of regulation all executive branch employees were
forbidden to use their official influence for political purposes, while employees
covered by the civil service system (classified employees) had additional restrictions
placed upon them. It was difficult to enforce any restrictions on those persons
employed in positions not classified under the Civil Service Act, however, because
the Civil Service Commission had no direct authority over those officials.9 Never-
theless, employees in the classified service had some job security and the restraints
on political activity were seen as safeguards to that security.'" Employees in the
classified service could not be dismissed for refusing to engage in political activity
when such activity was prohibited by law.
In 1882, in Ex Parte Curtis, the Supreme Court recognized the power of Con-
gress to restrict political activities of federal employees "to promote efficiency and
integrity in the discharge of official duties, and to maintain proper discipline in
the public service."" The statute under scrutiny in Ex Parte Curtis prohibited federal
employees from requesting, giving, or receiving political contributions from other
employees. The Court found that such a statute was necessary and proper to pro-
mote an efficient public service, because the "dread of dismissal" would take away
the "feeling of independence" needed for "faithful public service."' 2 The statute
was seen as having as its objective the protection of federal employees.' In a dis-
senting opinion, Justice Bradley decried the statutory prohibitions because they made
the relinquishment of certain political freedoms a condition of government
employment." He noted that the constitutionally protected freedoms of speech,
assembly, and to petition for redress of grievances should not be "trammelled by
inconvenient restrictions."' 5 Although Congress could take necessary actions to pre-
vent corruption and exertion of undue influence among federal employees, the means
I Act of Aug. 2, 1939, ch. 410, 53 Stat. 1147, as amended, and Act of July 19, 1940, ch. 640,
54 Stat. 767, as amended.
3 Irwin, Public Employees and the Hatch Act, 9 VAND. L. REv. 527, 533 (1956) (emphasis added).
9 Rose, A Critical Look at the Hatch Act, 75 HARV. L. REv. 510, 511 (1962).
0 Friedman & Klinger, supra note 3, at 7.
Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 373 (1882).
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used to accomplish these ends must not interfere with constitutionally protected
freedoms. 
6
Consequently, even before the passage of the Hatch Act, the lines of debate
were drawn between those who viewed the restriction of political activities as a
protection yielding job security and those who saw the restrictions as an infringe-
ment on the most fundamental rights of citizenship.
B. The Hatch Act
When Jefferson issued the first executive order restricting political activities
the federal government employed approximately 2,100 persons.' 7 By the time the
Pendleton Act was passed, there were about 140,000 federal employees but only
ten percent were covered by the new civil service system.'0 President Theodore
Roosevelt greatly extended the coverage of the classified civil service by including
all executive branch employees who were not laborers, presidential appointees, or
otherwise exempted by Congress or the President.' 9 By the time the Hatch Act
was passed in 1939, the number of federal employees had grown to 953,891 and
sixty-nine percent of those employees were covered by the Civil Service Act.20
The New Deal legislation promoted by Franklin Delano Roosevelt sent an
infusion of emergency relief dollars into the economy, much of it in the form of
funds for employment programs such as the Works Progress Administration
(W.P.A.). As early as 1935, strong criticism was aimed at the W.P.A. for the high
degree of political influence involved in the program's implementation.2 In response
to such criticism the W.P.A. Administrator issued a ruling, applicable to all nonrelief
personnel, that no W.P.A. employee could be a candidate for or hold elective
office. 22
Congress, however, was not satisfied solely with an administrative response
and included a similar provision in the 1936 appropriations bill.23 In addition, an
amendment prohibiting discrimination on the basis of political affiliation was
included.24 Roosevelt's political adversaries were not satisfied with these measures,
however, and after conducting an investigation of relief programs, offered an amend-
16 Id. at 378.
, H. E. KAPLAN, THE LAW OF CIVIL SERVICE 2 (1958).
I d. at 10.
Id. at 11.
20 Rose, supra note 9, at 511.
21 Proposed Amendments to the Hatch Political Activities Act: Hearing on H. R. 696 Before
the Subcomm. on Elections of the House Comm. on House Administration, 86th Cong., 1st and 2d
Sess. 30 (1960) (Appendix, Legislative History of the Hatch Act) [hereinafter cited as Legislative History
of the Hatch Act].
22 General Letter No. 2, published in 80 Cong. Rec. 7566 (1936).
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ment to the next W.P.A. appropriations bill applying the same restrictions to W.P.A.
administrative staff as then applied to civil service personnel. 25 After that amend-
ment failed, the Sheppard Committee on Campaign Expenditures and Use of
Governmental Funds conducted an investigation of the use of relief funds for
political purposes.2 6 That committee's recommendations formed the basis for the
bill which became the Hatch Act. 27
President Roosevelt responded to the legislative initiative by attempting to bring
all the relief programs' administrative staff under civil service. 21 Congress, however,
rejected that proposal and passed the Hatch Act. When he signed the Act on August
2, 1939, Roosevelt recommended changes to the Act which would have included
some state and local governments and allowed residents of the District of Columbia
and nearby areas to run for local office. 29 Roosevelt also interpreted the Act to
be designed to follow prior civil service regulations and rulings. 31
In the 1940s, Congress acted to extend coverage to employees of the District
of Columbia and state and local government employees working in federally
financed projects, but also permitted nonpartisan political activity by all covered
employees. 3' Another major statutory change took place in 1942 when employees
of educational and religious organizations supported by federal funds were exempted
from the political activity provisions of the Act. 32 Legislation to restrict the political
activities of federal employees was considered extensively during the late 1930s and
early 1940s, but legislative activity on this subject was not solely an initiative of
the federal government. States were also acting during this period to regulate
employees' political activities.
C. State Regulation33
Of the six states examined for this Note, three had some statutory restrictions
on political activities by public employees prior to the 1939 passage of the Hatch
Act .3 These early statutes were aimed primarily at prohibiting political assessments,
solicitations and improper use of influence among employees covered by the state
civil service system.
25 Legislative History of the Hatch Act, supra note 21, at 30.
26 Id.
2, Act of Aug. 2, 1939, ch. 410, 53 Stat. 1147.
Legislative History of the Hatch Act, supra note 21, at 32.
84 Cong. Rec. 10,747'(1939).
30 Id. at 10,746.
11 Act of July 19, 1940, ch. 640, 54 Stat. 767.
32 Act of Oct. 24, 1942, ch. 620, 56 Stat. 986. The concern here was based on state attorney
general rulings that teachers at land grant colleges and all other schools receiving federal funds would
be subject to the Act.
11 Statutes from the following states were examined for this Note: California, Florida, Michigan,
New York, Wisconsin, and West Virginia. They are discussed in detail in a later section of the text.
', California (1913), New York (1909), and Wisconsin (1929).
[Vol. 87
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The other three states passed their statutes after the enactment of the federal
law. 3 Although these statutes are also aimed primarily at civil service employees,
the provisions of these later state laws reflect a greater influence by the Hatch Act
than do those statutes which were originally enacted prior to the Act. The latter
states generally place more restrictions on covered personnel and include limita-
tions on partisan political activity.
III. NATURE OF STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS
A. Hatch Act
The Hatch Act, officially titled "an act to prevent pernicious political activities,"
makes it unlawful for any person, whether or not a government employee, to in-
terfere with any other person's right to vote for high federal officers, to make im-
proper promises (or threats) regarding government employment in exchange for
political activity, to solicit or receive political assessments or subscriptions from
federal employees or to furnish or receive employee lists to or from anyone for
political purposes.36
1. Federal Employees
Under the Hatch Act, virtually all federal employees of an executive branch
agency or in the competitive service37 are prohibited from using their "official
authority or influence for the purpose of interfering with" an election. 31 Additionally,
the statute provides for presidential rules which protect these same employees from
any obligation to make a political contribution and prohibit the use of official
authority or influence in a coercive fashion. 39 Most executive agency employees4"
are also prohibited from requesting or receiving political contributions from other
federal employees. 4' Employees on leave of absence remain covered by any other-
wise applicable restrictions.2
Most of the restrictions which are commonly thought of as "Hatch Act pro-
" Florida (1949), Michigan (1976), and West Virginia (1961).
36 Restrictions on political activity do not apply to individuals "employed by an educational or
research institution, establishment, agency, or system which is supported in whole or in part by the
District of Columbia or by a recognized religious, philanthropic, or cultural organization." 5 U.S.C.
§ 7324(c) (1982).
37 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321-7322 (1982).
3 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(1) (1982).
" Except direct presidential appointees.
5 U.S.C. § 7323 (1982).
" Act of Aug. 2, 1939, ch. 410, §§ 1-6, 53 Stat. 1147 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§
594-595, 598-601, 604-605 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1983)).
42 See, e.g., Commission rulings in Folsom, I POL. ACTIVITIEs REP. 104 (1945) and Lewis, 3 POL.
ACTIVITIES REP. 93a (Dec. 22, 1971).
1984]
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hibitions" are detailed in 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2), which prohibits employees of ex-
ecutive agencies and the District of Columbia from taking an active part in political
management or in political campaigns. Some employees are exempted from these
prohibitions. 3 Exempted employees include those paid by the office of the Presi-
dent, federal department heads and assistant heads, policy making direct presiden-
tial appointees, the Commissioners and the Recorder of Deeds of the District of
Columbia, 4 and employees residing in specific municipalities or other political sub-
divisions where many voters are federal employees.4"
Interestingly, the Hatch Act does not attempt to develop a detailed definition
of what activities fall within the prohibitions against political management or political
campaigning. Instead, the Act incorporates by reference "determinations of the
Civil Service Commission under the rules prescribed by the President." 46 The original
1939 Act had not made any provision for defining what activities would be
prohibited.47 During the debate over the 1940 amendments, significant resistance
arose to proposed language which would have given the Civil Service Commission
(Commission) broad powers to promulgate rules and regulations defining the pro-
hibited activities. 48 Senator Carl Hatch then proposed a substitute which apparently
incorporated the thousands of decisions made under the Civil Service Rules I and
IV before the passage of the Hatch Act and extended those rulings to all of the
additional employees covered by the Act.49 These many decisions of the Commis-
sion were not at first readily available to the public. After the passage of the Freedom
of Information Act,50 the Commission published the four-volume Political Activities
Reporter (P.A.R.) which contains a summary of the pre-1940 rulings and the actual
decisions made under the Hatch Act since that time.
It is beyond the scope of this Note to give a detailed breakdown of Commis-
sion decisions under Section 7324(a)(2) of the Hatch Act. The Code of Federal
Regulations, however, does list permissible and prohibited activities." Off-duty
federal employees are free to do the following:
-register and vote -participate in nonpartisan civic
-express their opinions organizations
-display political materials -join a political organization
5 U.S.C. § 7324(d) (1982).
I d.
5 U:S.C. § 7327 (1982). Employees exempted under this section include employees of the Alaska
Railroad and residents of Maryland or Virginia in the immediate D.C. vicinity, as well as any other
political subdivision designated by the Civil Service Commission "because of special or unusual cir-
cumstances." See 5 C.F.R. § 733.124 (1983).
46 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a) (1982).
4' Act of Aug. 2, 1939, ch. 410, § 9(a), 53 Stat. 1147, 1148.
11 Rose, supra note 9, at 513.
41 Id. at 513-514.
5o 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982).
" 5 C.F.R. §§ 733.101-.301 (1983).
[Vol. 87
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-attend a political gathering
-sign a political petition
-make a financial contribution
-be an independent candidate or take
an active part in a local partisan
election in one of the political sub-
divisions designated52
-fully participate in nonpartisan
elections
-perform election duties required by
state law
Similarly, federal employees are prohibited from improper use of official authority
or influence and from the following:
-holding political party office
-organizing a political club
-soliciting or receiving partisan political
funds
-organizing a partisan fundraiser
-helping to manage a partisan political
campaign
-becoming a partisan candidate
-soliciting votes for or against a partisan
candidate
-acting as a pollworker in a partisan
capacity
-driving voters to the polls in a partisan
capacity
-endorsing or opposing a partisan can-
didate through any public medium
-serving as a delegate, etc. at a political
party convention
-addressing a political party convention,
rally, etc. in a partisan nominating
petition
2. Certain State and Local Employees
Employees of state and local executive branch agencies "whose principal employ-
ment is in connection with ' " 3 an activity receiving any federal funds are covered
by 5 U.S.C. ch. 15. A large group of state and local government employees is,
however, exempted from the Hatch Act. Not covered are employees of any "educa-
tional or research institution, establishment, agency or system" supported by state
or local governments or a recognized religious, charitable, or cultural organization."
The language of section 1501 defining covered employees has been construed
by the Commission and the courts to include a large proportion of state and local
government employees. Even though an employee works only part-time for the
government, that employment may be found to be his or her "principal
employment."" It has been ruled that, if the employee has policy making adminis-
trative responsibilities, it does not matter if only one percent of his or her time
is spent on federally aided projects . 6 Generally speaking, all employees of the follow-
'2 These are the political subdivisions specified in 5 C.F.R. § 733.124 (1983). See supra note 45.
5 U.S.C. § 1501(4) (1982).
4 Id. § 1501(4)(B).
11 See, e.g., In re Higginbotham, 340 F.2d 165 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 853 (1965); Smyth
& Sheboygan County v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 291 F. Supp. 568 (E.D. Wis. 1968).
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ing types of state and local departments or agencies are included: health, highway,
welfare, unemployment, housing and urban development authorities, veterans af-
fairs, agriculture, and civil defense." As with federal employees, an employee on
leave of absence remains covered by the Hatch Act. 8
Covered state and local government employees initially were subject to the same
restrictions as federal employees. 9 The regulations covering these employees were
almost identical to those described in the previous section which covered federal
employees. Beginning in 1941, however, numerous bills were offered in Congress
to repeal section 12 of the Hatch Act, which provided for regulation of thl political
activities of officers and employees of state and local agencies receiving federal
loans or grants. Extensive investigation and study led to committee proposals to
repeal these provisions." Section 12 was termed "probably the most unpopular
Federal legislation ever imposed on our State and local governments," based on
a committee survey. 6'
Finally, in 1974, Congress was successful in amending the Hatch Act to loosen
restrictions on covered state and local employees. The restriction on active par-
ticipation in political management and campaigns was repealed and, in its place,
language was inserted which prohibited only being "a candidate for elective office."' 62
Additionally, another section allows all covered employees to be candidates in com-
pletely nonpartisan elections.63
These changes in statutory language substantially loosened the limitations
imposed on state and local government employees. The provisions of the amend-
ment are implemented in 5 C.F.R. part 151, which simply repeats the statutory
prohibitions on improper use of official authority, coercion of contributions, and
being a candidate in a partisan election. The restrictions in section 1502(a)(3) re-
garding candidacy do not apply to the governor or lieutenant governor, the mayor
of a city, a nonclassified elected head of an executive department, or an individual
brought under the Hatch Act by virtue of holding an elective office, as far as running
again for that same office." Additionally, any covered state or local employee may
Annot., 8 A.L.R. FED. 343, 355-56 n.4 (1971).
Act of July 19, 1940, ch. 640, 54 Stat. 767, 767-68 (adding § 12 to the Hatch Act).
See, e.g., Montgomery, 3 POL. ACTIVITY REP. 45 (Feb. 18, 1970).
60 H.R. REP. No. 13, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1959).
61 Id. at 32. Comments illicited by the Committee from state officials were interesting in their
broad range of opinions and perceptions. Some examples are given below. California: Restrictions are
no longer justified after demise of W.P.A., and problems could be more properly dealt with by state
legislatures. Id. at 46-47. Florida: Federal laws are amply justified. Id. at 48. Michigan: Officials felt
restrictions would not apply to local employees. Id. at 51. New York: No comments were given; of-
ficials simply sent a listing of numbers of covered employees. Id. at 91. West Virginia: The Hatch
Act is never considered by state employees, since most "think it unconstitutional." Id. at 106. Wiscon-
sin: The response indicated that employees would welcome repeal. Id. at 56.
62 5 U.S.C. § 1502(a)(3) (1982).
63 Id. § 1503.
" Id. § 1502(c).
[Vol. 87
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run for political office or be a candidate to serve as a delegate to a political party
convention.6"
Other than the restrictions on partisan candidacy, a covered state or local
employee is free-at least in so far as federal law is concerned-to participate freely
in political activities, including political management and campaigning.
B. State Laws Restricting Political Activity
A 1968 study by a federal commission indicated that eight states had laws more
restrictive than the Hatch Act. 66 Nine state statutes were classified as similar to
the Hatch Act.67 Thirty-three states had laws less restrictive than the Hatch Act,
with ten of those in the class imposing little or no restriction on political activities. 68
As noted earlier, the statutes of six states were examined in order to obtain
a sampling of the current nature of state control over the political activities of
public employees. Each of these state statutes will be discussed in this section, ex-
amining both the employees who are covered and the types of activities that are
restricted. Several statutes apply not only to state employees, but also to employees
of local governments. Additionally, some provisions could be viewed as more restric-
tive than those imposed on state and local employees by the Hatch Act. This is
compatible with congressional intent in passing the 1974 amendment to the Hatch
Act, which was not meant to preempt or supersede state laws regulating the activities
of state and local government employees. 69
California's statute"0 is generally nonrestrictive, but applies to employees of
all state agencies, including the universities and the state legislature, and to employees
of local governments except school districts and municipal corporations.7 ' The only
activities specifically restricted by the statute are improper use of influence,7" solicita-
tion of contributions from employees of the same agency,73 and participating in
political activities while in uniform.7 Although local governments may restrict
political activities on the premises or during working hours,75 no other limitations
5 C.F.R. § 151.122(f) (1983).
2 Conmission on Political Activity of Government Personnel, A Commission Report 92 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Conm'n on Pol. Activity].
6' Id.
68 Id. at 98.
6 Act of Oct. 10, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5587, 5669
(codified at 5 U.S.C. § 1502).
" CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3201-09 (Deering 1982 & Supp. 1984).
" Id. § 3202.
n Id. § 3204.
" Id. § 3205.
" Id. § 3206.
' Id. § 3207.
1984]
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are allowed. 76 It can be seen from the limited nature of these restrictions that public
employees in California enjoy a great deal of freedom of political activity. Of course,
Hatch Act prohibitions still apply to covered employees."
Michigan's statute78 is similarly nonrestrictive, and covers state civil service
employees and nonelected employees of any political subdivision.79 Classified state
employees may participate in most political activities and may run for local office
without a leave of absence or for state office while on leave of absence. Employees
who are candidates for local office may be required to take leave only if they are
running for office in the unit of government in which they are employed.' Per-
mitted activities, however, cannot be engaged in during work time. 2 Coercing
political contributions from other public employees is also prohibited." Additionally,
covered employees are required to comply with Hatch Act provisions. 4
New York law closely parallels some of the criminal provisions of the federal
law concerning coercion and corruption, but provides for few limitations on an
employee's rights to engage in political activity. The election law statute regarding
pernicious political activities establishes misdemeanor penalties for any person who
engages in coercion or interference with another's voting rights, who makes im-
proper promises or threats regarding government employment, who solicits or
receives political assessments, or who furnishes employee lists for political purposes."
Subsequent sections provide for additional misdemeanor offenses if these "per-
nicious activities" are engaged in by public employees.86
New York's civil service law proscribes certain other activities, such as basing
employment recommendations on the basis of political affiliation, improperly using
authority to coerce political actions or contributions, improperly inquiring as to
political affiliation, political assessments, and improperly promising or threatening
to use official influence regarding public employment.87 The limitations under the
civil service law apply to classified state employees and to classified employees of
any civil division of the state.8 Other than those restrictions listed, the New York
civil servant is free to engage in political activities.
76 Id. § 3208.
,7 Id. § 3203.
" MICH. STAT. ANN. § 4.1702 (Callaghan 1977 & Supp. 1984).
79 Id. § 4.1702(l).
80 Id. § 4.1702(2)(c).
I, d. § 4.1702(3)(1)(c). If an employee is elected, however, he or she must take a leave of absence
or resign.
SZ Id. § 4.1702(4).
3 Id. § 4.1702(5).
I d. § 4.1702(7).
N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 17-154 (McKinney 1978).
86 Id. §§ 17-156, 17-158.
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Florida's law more substantially curtails the political activities of its state civil
service employees. In addition to restrictions against political discrimination, im-
proper use of authority, and giving or accepting payment for civil service employ-
ment, the statute prohibits a state employee from being a candidate for or holding
public office unless approval is received from the Department of Administration
to run for and serve in a local office found not to conflict with the state
employment.89 State employees may not take an active part in any political cam-
paign while on duty."' County and municipal employees, while prohibited from
improper use of authority and coercion of contributions, are allowed to run for
and hold public office and to participate in political campaigns during off-duty
hours."
Wisconsin's political activities law applies to employees of the state classified
service, including institutions of higher learning, 92 but does not mention county
or municipal employees. Besides the familiar prohibitions against solicitation of
contributions and political activities while on duty, an employee must take a leave
of absence to run for office and must resign his or her classified employment if
elected." Leaves also may be granted for partisan campaigning which would other-
wise interfere with an employee's duties.9
Of all the states sampled, West Virginia's law is the most restrictive." The
West Virginia statute contains the usual prohibitions against political discrimina-
tion, improper use of authority, and political assessments. The statute, however,
lists a number of restrictions on otherwise legitimate political activities, including
holding party office, being a candidate for national or state paid public office,
or holding paid public office. 7
The West Virginia statute was amended in 1983 and the administrative rule
called for by the statute has not yet been promulgated, but some forms of political
" FLA. STAT. ANN. § 110.233 (West 1982).
9 Id.
91 Id. § 104.31.
92 Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 230.01-.03 (West Supp. 1982).
93 Id. § 16.35.
I' d.
W . VA. CODE § 29-6-20(e) (Supp. 1984). This is true in spite of the fact that the West Virginia
statute was amended in 1983 to allow broader political participation by covered employees. The earlier
version of W. VA. CODE § 29-6-20(e) had prohibited an employee from taking "any part in the manage-
ment or affairs of any political party or in any political campaign, except to exercise his right as a
citizen privately to express his opinion and to cast his vote." W. VA. CODE § 29-6-20(e) (1980) (em-
phasis added). The relaxing of the earlier statutory prohibitions may well have been in response to
a West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals decision which gave an "appropriate narrow interpreta-
tion" to an even more stringent statute. Weaver v. Shaffer, 290 S.E.2d 244, 251 (W.Va. 1980). In
Weaver, the West Virginia court construed the state statute to prohibit only those activities proscribed
by the United States Supreme Court in United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter
Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
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activity previously barred apparently are now allowed. Political campaigning and
management are permitted.9" A covered employee must take a leave of absence
in order to be a candidate for a local paid public office, and an employee may
hold any unpaid public office.9 9 The full ramifications of the 1983 statutory language
will only become certain after opportunity for administrative and judicial
interpretation.
In contrast to its broadly worded restrictive provisions, the coverage of the
West Virginia statute is limited. Employees of the Board of Regents are considered
neither exempt nor classified.' While the Governor is empowered to add to the
list of classified positions, the statute requires that numerous employees remain
exempt. Included among those exemptions are all policymakers, laborers, and county
road maintenance supervisors.'
C. Miscellaneous Federal Statutes and Regulations of Nongovernmental
Employees
Not all political limitations on federally funded employees are contained within
the Hatch Act. Some enabling statutes which fund services on the local level also
provide for restrictions on the political activities of the persons paid by these pro-
grams. An important distinction between employees covered under these statutes
and those covered under the Hatch Act is that these employees are not classified
under civil service and, generally, are not public employees at all.
One of the most striking examples of the regulation of persons employed by
nongovernmental organizations involves Community Action Agencies (CAAs). 02
CAAs must be either governmental units or nonprofit agencies.' 3 Services pro-
vided by CAAs vary from community to community, but include such projects
as Head Start centers, Meals on Wheels programs, and weatherization assistance
to the economically needy. In practice, many CAAs are private, nonprofit agen-
cies. Yet, 42 U.S.C. § 2943 (repealed in 1981) provided that every CAA would
be treated as a state or local agency for the purposes of the Hatch Act. No distinc-
tion was made between governmental and nonprofit organizations. Thus, employees
of private nonprofit agencies which received funds from this program were subject
to the same constraints on their political activities as were state and local govern-
9, Id.
99 Id.
,I0 Id. § 29-6-4.
101 Id.
,02 Community Action Agencies were originally funded by the now dismantled Office of Economic
Opportunity (O.E.O.). The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 was repealed, except for the VISTA
and Legal Services Programs, by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35,
95 Stat. 519 (1982).
,o1 42 U.S.C. § 2790 (repealed 1981).
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ment employees covered by the Hatch Act. The current Code of Federal Regula-
tions still contains the regulations ' implementing these restrictions, despite the
repeal of the statutory authority for such constraints. Generally, these programs
are still operated in a manner which complies with these limitations." 5
Staff attorneys for programs funded by the Legal Services Corporation are
also subject to the restrictions of chapter 15 of title 5 of the U.S. Code"0 6 even
though many are not employed by state or local governments.' 7 An earlier statutory
provision which applied to legal services employees contained restrictions even more
extensive than those in the Hatch Act. That provision was upheld in federal courts. 0
The statute has since been amended to conform with the Hatch Act.
Volunteers under the Domestic Volunteer Service Act'0 9 (VISTA workers) are
subject to the same limitations as federal employees." ' In addition, they are pro-
hibited from engaging in any voter registration activities, helping with any effort
to provide transportation to the polls, or attempting to influence any legislation."'
IV. EMPLOYEE PERCEPTIONS OF RESTRICTIONS
As in so many other areas of the law, many employees only vaguely under-
stand their rights and responsibilities under the Hatch Act or under similar state
statutes. While almost all government employees know whether they are employed
as part of the classified civil service, they are less likely to be certain of the extent
to which their continued employment is conditioned on compliance with rules
regulating their political activities. Many employees, when asked to speak out con-
cerning a legislative issue, will respond that they cannot because they are covered
by the Hatch Act. Often, employees of noncovered private nonprofit corporations
are told by superiors that they too are subject to the Hatch Act because the organiza-
tion receives federal grant dollars.
Scholars have devoted little study to the issue of employee perceptions of
statutory restrictions on political rights. It matters little if the actual language of
a statute allows a given activity if the public perception is that it does not. The
chilling effect is just as real whether the prohibition is based on an accurate or
inaccurate perception of the law involved.
'o' 45 C.F.R. § 1069.8 (1983).
101 Telephone interview with Ken Dean, Executive Director, North Central Community Action
Association (March 16, 1984).
,06 42 U.S.C. § 2996e(e) (1982).
1*7 Id. § 2996e(a)(1)(A). Interestingly, under this provision, contracts to provide legal services may
be given (and restrictions applied) to individuals, partnerships, and firms as well as nonprofit organizations.
'0' Smith v. Ehrlich, 430 F. Supp. 818 (D.D.C. 1976).
, Pub. L. No. 93-113, 87 Stat. 394 (1973).
,0 See 45 C.F.R. § 1226.6 (1983).
"' Id. § 1226.8.
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In 1967, the U.S. Commission on Political Activity of Government Personnel
issued a report which included results of surveys of government personnel. While
nine-tenths of the federal employees questioned knew that there were restrictions
on their political activities, thirty-eight percent either had not heard of the Hatch
Act or did not know the general purpose of the Act."1 2 Similarly, only one-half
of the state employees questioned understood the general purpose of the Hatch
Act.'1 3
The Commission's research showed that, while a large majority of government
employees were aware that they were free to write to their Congressman and were
prohibited from running for partisan office, there was substantial confusion re-
garding the propriety of many other political activities."' Nearly fifty percent of
those questioned thought they were allowed to drive people to the polls on election
day, but Civil Service Commission rulings have held this to be a prohibited activity." II
Somewhere between a quarter to a third of those sampled were not aware that
they were permitted to become involved in nonpartisan issues and campaigns." 6
One-fourth of both federal and state employees felt they could not put a political
bumper sticker on their cars (with another thirteen percent of the federal employees
indicating that they were not sure if this was permitted). Thus, it is apparent that
even among those employees who were aware of the federal restrictions, many did
not have a clear picture of just what these restrictions were." 7 The Chairman of
the Commission, Arthur S. Flemming, recommended a vigorous effort to educate
government employees regarding their rights and responsibilities." 8
Two recent surveys conducted among social service workers in West Virginia
indicated that confusion regarding permissible and prohibited political activities still
exists. In 1982, a policy analysis by the West Virginia University School of Social
Work found that "employees for the most part are uninformed about state and
federal regulations on participation in political activities."' 9 Only twenty-seven per-
cent of the employees surveyed felt that state and federal regulations were clear
enough for them to know what activities were allowed.'2 °
An informal survey conducted for this Note among members of two county-
level councils of social agencies produced similar results.' 2 ' All of the persons
Conm'n on PoL Activity, supra note 66, at 9-10.
I1 d. at 75.
Id. at 10-11, 75-76.
"' Id. at 11, 75. At the time of this survey, the restrictions on state employees were identical
to those on federal employees.
116 Id.
'7 Id. at 23. Of the 980 federal employees surveyed, none got more than 8 of 10 correct answers
to questions designed to test knowledge of specific restrictions on political activities.
Id. at 1.
"9 L. Schultz, THE HATCH ACT: A POLICY ANALYSIS OF ITS APPLICATION TO SOCIAL SERVICE AGENCIEs
IN WEST VIRGINIA (1982) (available from the School of Social Work, Morgantown, WV).
120 Id.
,"I A survey was conducted in March of 1984. Respondents included employees of governmental
units and nonprofit organizations, who were tested on their knowledge of specific restrictions.
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surveyed knew if they were covered by the civil service system. Of those working
for agencies receiving federal or state funds, all reported either that they were covered
by the Hatch Act or that they did not know. Actually, only one-half of the agen-
cies involved are so covered. Employees of state agencies seemed to know about
applicable restrictions at a level roughly comparable to employees in the earlier
cited studies. The most disturbing finding of this informal survey was that many
persons not covered by federal or state restrictions thought they were covered and
reported a number of legitimate political activities in which they felt constrained
from participation.
V. COURT ENFORCEMENT OF STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS
The constitutionality of the Hatch Act and its limitations on the political
freedoms of federal employees was first upheld in United Public Workers v.
Mitchell.'22 A roller employed by the U.S. Mint faced discharge for serving as a
ward committeeman and for election day work at the polls.'I 3 The Court recognized
that the Hatch Act interfered with freedoms guaranteed citizens under the first,
ninth, and tenth amendments. 24 Nevertheless, the Court pointed out, "these fun-
damental human rights are not absolutes."' 25 First amendment rights must sometimes
yield "to the elemental need for order without which the guarantees of civil rights
to others would be a mockery." '' 26 If the exercise of federal authority is based on
-powers granted by the Constitution, then the rights infringed upon are not reserved
to the states or the people under the ninth and tenth amendments.' 2'
In Mitchell, the Court did not seriously address the first amendment question
raised, but concentrated on the arguments that Congress did not have the power
to enact legislation such as the Hatch Act. Congressional prohibitions of employee
political activities were first upheld in 1882,128 and, in Mitchell, the Court reaffirmed
its position that it is within the power of Congress to reasonably regulate active
political participation of government employees in order to promote the efficiency
of public service. 2 9
A decision handed down on the same day as Mitchell confirmed the propriety
of the extension of Hatch Act prohibitions to covered state and local government
employees. 3 In Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Commission, the Court
stated Mitchell applied to state and local employees, and the Act's interference
122 United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
123 Id. at 92.
,2, Id. at 95.
,27 Id.
126 Id.
12, Id. at 96.
'2' Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 (1882).
Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 99.
ISO Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
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with freedom of expression was not unconstitutional. 3 ' The distinction that those
covered are not federal employees was disposed of with a one-sentence observa-
tion: "While the United States is not concerned with, and has no power to regulate,
local political activities as such of state officials, it does have power to fix the
terms upon which its money allotments to states shall be disbursed."',
The Mitchell and Oklahoma decisions reflect a high degree of deference to
the determinations of Congress. The Court held that
Congress may regulate the political conduct of government employees "within
reasonable limits," even though the regulation trenches to some extent upon un-
fettered political action. The determination of the extent to which political activities
of governmental employees shall be regulated lies primarily with Congress. Courts
will interfere only when such regulation passes beyond the generally existing con-
ception of governmental power."'
The Court, however, did say that the conception of the proper extent of govern-
mental power is an evolving one, based not only on history and practice, but on
changing societal conditions.' 34
Prior to the decisions in Mitchell and Oklahoma, the Court had applied a rather
strict standard of review for any statute which restricted first amendment freedoms.
Statutes had been required to be "narrowly drawn to define and punish specific
conduct as constituting a clear and present danger to a substantial interest of the
State."' 35 The marketplace of opinion had to be freely open to allow debate of
matters of public interest, and discussion of issues could not be restricted by broadly
written statutes. 136
In spite of these precedents which stringently tested statutory language abridging
first amendment freedoms, the Mitchell court applied a rational nexus test in its
scrutiny of the Hatch Act. "For regulation of employees it is not necessary that
the act regulated be anything more than an act reasonably deemed by Congress
to interfere with the efficiency of the public service."""
Little in the Mitchell decision explains the Court's departure from its previously
adopted strict scrutiny standard for restrictions of fundamental freedoms. Clearly,
the Court recognizes a greater governmental interest in regulating the speech of
government employees than it does in regulating the speech of the general public. 
While not expressly stated in the Mitchell decision, it is also possible that, given
Id. at 142.
" Id. at 143.
Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 102.
", Id.
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940).
136 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104-05 (1940).
137 Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 101 (emphasis added).
"I Id. at 95.
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the then-accepted view of public employment as a privilege rather than a right,
the Court felt that government is free to impose any conditions it wishes in offering
employment.' 39
While the Mitchell opinion addressed the issue of the constitutionality of re-
stricting the individual political rights of a federal employee, the Oklahoma deci-
sion dealt with matters such as state sovereignty and statutory implementation. The
Court pointed to the holding in United States v. Darby'4 1 which stated that if the
Constitution grants a power to the federal government then all means "which
are appropriate and plainly adapted to the permitted end" 14 2 may be utilized. The
Court found that fixing the terms for allocating federal dollars so that state and
local employees were compelled to comply with the Hatch Act was appropriate
to the end of "better public service."' 4 2 In response to a claim by the State of
Oklahoma that the penalty provisions of the Hatch Act amounted to federal coer-
cion, the Court simply observed that "[t]he offer of benefits to a state by the United
States dependent upon cooperation by the State with federal plans, assumedly for
the general welfare, is not unusual."'
4
'1
Oklahoma argued that the Hatch Act was void for vagueness, but the Court
rejected this contention by pointing to section 15 of the Act and its incorporation
of previous civil service determinations. 44 While Oklahoma asserted that the federal
courts should review every detail of an appealed Commission order, the Court chose
to adopt the standard that it would remand a decision only if it could be deter-
mined that the Commission abused its discretion in making its determination.'
45
Thus, with the Mitchell and Oklahoma decisions, it became clear that the Court
would enforce the Hatch Act in its totality. While it would be twenty-six years
before a similar state statute, patterned after the Hatch Act, was examined by the
Court, limitations imposed by the states were also found to be constitutional.'4 6
Nevertheless, it should not be assumed that, because the Court enforced the
Act, the controversies surrounding the curtailing of individual political freedoms
were completely extinguished. The Court decisions were far from unanimous. 14
"I Minge, Federal Restrictions on the Political Activities of State and Local Employees, 57 MINN.
L. REv. 493, 531 n.206 (1973).
"40 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
4' Id. at 124.
12 Oklahoma, 330 U.S. at 143.
',' Id. at 144.
144 Id.
14' Id. at 145-46.
46 Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973). It is ironic that the first of the "little Hatch
Acts" to be challenged would be Oklahoma's and that the statute would be assailed on the grounds
of vagueness.
4' Justices Murphy and Jackson took no part in either decision. Justice Frankfurter concurred
in both, but raised procedural questions. Justices Black and Rutledge dissented in both cases and Justice
Douglas dissented in Mitchell.
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Justice Douglas, in his dissent in Mitchell, pointed out that the Court had previ-
ously insisted that statutes be narrowly drawn when individual constitutional rights
were balanced with a perceived community interest.'48 Douglas could see no adequate
justifications for depriving all government workers of political rights and would
have upheld the Act only if it had limited the political restrictions to appropriate
classes of government employees, such as policymakers or administrative person-
nel.'4 9 Justice Black dissented because "[liegislation which muzzles several million
citizens threatens popular government, not only because it injures the individuals
muzzled, but also because of its harmful effect on the body politic in depriving
it of the political participation and interest of such a large segment of our citizens."',10
In addition, Black was concerned that the arguments which supported the majority's
decision would similarly support legislation in which the political rights of groups
other than governmental employees were suppressed.'
The arguments in these dissenting opinions have formed the basis for numerous
subsequent attacks on Hatch Act-type provisions and will be addressed in more
detail in the concluding sections of this Note.
State courts have generally found that reasonable restrictions on political activity
by public employees are permissible.152 Earlier cases upheld severe limitations on
the exercise of first amendment freedoms, especially as applied to uniformed
employees, apparently on the theory that public employment is a matter of
privilege. 153
A local ordinance prohibiting county employees from seeking elective public
office or engaging in certain other political activities was upheld by the Supreme
Court of Florida in a 1973 case.' 4 The Florida court relied on language in the
Mitchell and Oklahoma decisions to find that the local ordinance was neither un-
constitutionally vague nor overbroad. '
As will be discussed later, however, many of the more recent state court decisions
have questioned or overturned broadly drawn prohibitions as unconstitutional in-
fringements on the freedom of speech.
VI. LEGISLATIVE CONSIDERATION OF EASING RESTRICTIONS
Congress, from time to time, has studied the implementation of the Hatch Act,
,, Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 124.
49 Id. at 122-23.
110 Id. at 111.
" ' Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 717, 720 (1969).
,51 See, e.g., People exrel. Clifford v. Scannell, 74 A.D. 406, 77 N.Y.S. 704 (1902), aff'd mein.,
173 N.Y. 606, 66 N.E. 1114 (1903); State ex rel. McKittrick v. Kirby, 349 Mo. 988, 163 S.W.2d 990 (1942).
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and various proposals have been advanced to loosen the restrictions on govern-
ment employees. As noted earlier, beginning in 1941, there were bills introduced
to repeal or amend the Act.'16 In 1959, a major report was issued by the House,
recommending more flexibility in the punishments than provided for by the Act,
urging the removal of state and local employees from coverage, and allowing federal
employees to participate in partisan activity on a local level.' 5
The Commission on Political Activity of Governmental Personnel made a
number of recommendations in 1968. The Commission noted the tension between
encouraging citizen participation in the political process and assuring governmental
integrity and an impartial civil service.' The Commission recommended expanding
permitted political activities while strengthening sanctions and enforcement provi-
sions aimed at coercion and improper use of authority or official position.'5 9 It
was the unanimous opinion of the Commission that, rather than incorporating by
reference the many rulings of the Civil Service Commission, the limitations on the
political activities of covered employees should be "clearly and specifically expressed,
and that beyond those limits political participation should be permitted. ' ' 60
In 1974, the recommendations of several commissions were adopted when Hatch
Act restrictions on state and local employees were significantly loosened.' 6 ' The
only comment included in the formal legislative history of this amendment indicated
that more restrictive state laws were still permitted. ' 62 Nevertheless, it can be assumed
that the congressional action in relaxing the relevant provisions of the Hatch Act
was facilitated by the cumulative weight of the many recommendations and studies
urging such action.
The following year, proposals were introduced in both houses of Congress to
restore to federal employees their "rights to participate, as private citizens, in the
political life of the Nation."'' 63 Another bill, known as the Federal Employees'
Political Activities Act of 1976, eventually passed both the Senate and the House.' 6
Basically, this bill was aimed at opening up the political process to federal employees
while strengthening the protections of the merit system.' 65 It prohibited improper
use of authority, solicitation, and all political activities while on duty, while in
a federal building or while in uniform.'6 6 The bill also provided for leaves to be
granted to employee/candidates, a separate board to decide on violations, and a
,56 H. R. REP. No. 13, supra note 60, at 35-41.
"I Id. at 4.
"' 1 Commission on Political Activity of Government Personnel, A Commission Report 3 (1968).
"' Id. at 3-4.
110 Id. at 3.
"' 5 U.S.C. § 1502(a)(3) (1982).
"6 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NFws 5587, 5669.
.3 S  372, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). See H.R. 3000, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975).
164 H.R. 8617, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
'6' 122 CoNG. REc. 11,867 (1976).
,66 H.R. 8617, supra note 164.
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program to educate employees regarding their rights and responsibilities under the
Act. 167
President Ford vetoed the 1976 Act, stating that the amendments "would deny
the lessons of history." ' 68 Ford felt that subtle pressures could be brought to bear
on government employees which would not be deterred by the sanctions in the bill.
The Hatch Act, he said, had been successful in balancing the first amendment rights
of employees against the need for a fair and effective government. 169 Neither the
House nor the Senate overrode the Presidential veto.
The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978170 provided for the creation of a Merit
System Protection Board and for safeguarding the operation of merit principles
in practice. While government employees were not extended any greater degree of
political freedom, the Act may be viewed as buttressing the protective functions
of the Hatch Act by protecting whistleblowers and strengthening disciplinary actions
under the merit system."'
VII. STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS IN LIGHT OF DEVELOPING CONSTITUTIONAL
CONCEPTS
Legislative chambers are not the only forums in which the viability of limita-
tions on the political freedoms of public employees has been questioned. The con-
stitutionality of these limitations continues to be scrutinized by the courts, even
in the face of the Mitchell decision and its subsequent reaffirmations by the Supreme
Court. The courts' scrutiny has grown more exacting as the concept of first amend-
ment freedoms has evolved.
Several state courts have recognized that curtailment of first amendment rights
must survive exacting scrutiny. In Fort v. Civil Service Commission,' the Supreme
Court of California held that a statute restricting the exercise of first amendment
rights must be based on a compelling state interest and drawn as narrowly as possible
to satisfy the state's purpose.' 73 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Michigan has
found that before an administrative agency may regulate off-duty participation in
political activity it must show that such activity has actually interfered with job
performance.' 74
In the Mitchell decision, the United States Supreme Court had applied a rational
nexus test in upholding the Hatch Act. " 5 This standard was a departure from that
167 Id.
"I H.R. Doc. No. 449, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REc. 10,561 (1976).
169 Id.
70 Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (1978).
" 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2723, 2728-30.
372 Fort v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 61 Cal. 2d 331, 392 P.2d 385, 38 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1964).
'M Id. at 337, 392 P.2d at 388-89, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 628-29.
" Council No. 11, AFSCME v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 408 Mich. 385, 292 N.W.2d 442 (1980).
"I Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 101.
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previously applied in first amendment situations.'76 Soon thereafter, however, in
a similar case the Court returned to a more stringent standard, observing: "It is
basic that no showing merely of a rational relationship to some colorable state
interest would suffice, in this highly sensitive constitutional area, '[o]nly the gravest
abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible
limitation.' '"77 Indeed, the Court reasserted the principle that "only a compelling
state interest ... can justify limiting First Amendment freedoms."' 7 8 In addition
to the "compelling state interest" test, the Court also required a showing that no
less restrictive form of regulation was available before limitations on first amend-
ment rights would be upheld.' 79
[E]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that pur-
pose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties
when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridg-
ment must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic
purpose.'
Decisions like these led many commentators of the late sixties and early seventies
to speculate that the Supreme Court would reassess the constitutionality of Hatch
Act restrictions at the next opportunity.'8 '
Despite possible abridgements of first amendment freedoms, two 1973 deci-
sions, Letter Carriers and Broadrick, 8 2 held the Hatch Act and a similar state statute
to be valid and "unhesitatingly" reaffirmed Mitchell.'83 The Court stated "neither
the First Amendment nor any other provision of the Constitution invalidates a law
barring this kind of partisan political conduct by federal employees."' 8
In both Letter Carriers and Broadrick the restrictive statutes involved were
attacked on grounds of vagueness and overbreadth. In Letter Carriers, the Court
observed, however, that "our task is not to destroy the Act if we can, but to con-
,76 See supra text accompanying notes 133-34.
'" Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530
(1945)).
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
"7 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407.
1O Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
"' See, e.g., Minge, supra note 139, at 496, 534. Fleishman, Freedom of Speech and Equality
of Political Opportunity: The Constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 51 N.C.L.
REv. 389, 444 (1973).
8 Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973); Broadrick, 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
,S Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 556.
Id. After analyzing the historical and philosophical basis for the political prohibitions con-
tained in the Hatch Act, the Court stated:
We agree with the basic holding of Mitchell that plainly identifiable acts of political manage-
ment and political campaigning on the part of federal employees may constitutionally be
prohibited. Until now this has been the judgment of the lower federal courts, and we do
not understand the District Court in this case to have questioned the constitutionality of a
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strue it ... so as to comport with constitutional limitations."' The Court then
found that Congress did not improperly grant the Civil Service Commission the
legislative function of determining the definition of prohibited activities, but in-
tended the Commission to develop the law within the bounds of the 1940 Rules
incorporated by reference into the Hatch Act. 6 The regulations issued by the Com-
mission specifying conduct prohibited under the Act'8 7 were found not to be im-
permissibly vague,'1 since "the ordinary person exercising ordinary common sense
can sufficiently understand and comply with" the prohibitions.8 9
The Court was less adamant in its finding that the questioned statutes were
not overbroad. In Letter Carriers, the Court found there was nothing "fatally over-
broad about the statute when it is considered in connection with the Commission's
construction of its terms" detailed in the regulations.8 0 Thus, the Court depended
on administrative regulations and interpretations to support its finding that the
statute itself was constitutional. The appellants in Broadrick conceded the constitu-
tionality of the application of the state statute to their conduct, and the Court
did not directly address their vicariously asserted argument of overbreadth.' 90
However, the Court said:
It has long been recognized that the First Amendment needs breathing space
and that statutes attempting to restrict or burden the exercise of First Amendment
rights must be narrowly drawn and represent a considered legislative judgment that
a particular mode of expression has to give way to other compelling needs of
society.' 92
While some challenges to statutes by those not directly impacted have been allowed
subsequently because of possible chilling effects on the exercise of constitutionally
protected rights, 93 no such attack was allowed in Broadrick because the statute
involved limited not only the spoken word, but conduct as well. 94 Arguments based
on facial overbreadth were found to be too attenuated where government was
regulating conduct as well as speech.195
Previous rulings had established that, although public employment could be
withheld completely from an individual, it could not be subjected to unreasonable
"' Id. at 571.
"' Id. at 571-72.
5 C.F.R. § 733.122 (1983).
ItS Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 577.
'" Id. at 579. This language was also adopted in Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 608.
"' Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 580. In Broadriek, the Court also relied on an administrative ruling
limiting the application of the challenged statute. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 617.
"' Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 610.
Id. at 611-12.
Id. at 612.
114 Id. at 612-14.
'" Id. at 615. In Magill v. Lynch, 560 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978),
the court ruled that a statute regulating conduct as well as pure speech must be found substantially
overbroad to be found void on its face.
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conditions. 96 This position represented a departure from the view, prevalent at
the time of the Mitchell decision, that since public employment was a privilege,
it could be subjected to any and all conditions imposed by statute. Under this re-
quirement of reasonableness of employment restrictions, the Court found improper
the dismissal of a teacher who had spoken out publicly regarding a bond issue.
The Court found that there had to be "a balance between the interests of the teacher,
as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of
the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency" of public services.' 97
Although the Court conceded in Pickering v. Board of Education that the state's
interest in regulating the speech of its employees is greater than its comparable
interest in the general citizenry, 198 such an interest must be analyzed in light of
the specific issues of efficiency and interference with job performance. 99 When
an employee's public statements were found not to affect performance or have
an impact on the operation of the agency generally, the employer's interest in limiting
the political speech of that employee was held "not significantly greater than its
interest in limiting a similar contribution by any member of the general public.""'0
The Pickering decision was not mentioned in the majority opinion in Letter
Carriers. It is difficult to understand why the Court did not apply the tests so clearly
articulated in Pickering in its reassessment of the propriety of the Hatch Act. In
his dissent in Letter Carriers, Justice Douglas pointed out that in Pickering and
in Wood v. Georgia"° ' the Court had required a showing of interference with of-
ficial duties in order to justify adverse actions as a result of political speech. 2
Douglas called for "substantial revision" of the Hatch Act by Congress in order
to "meet the need for narrowly drawn language" which would not unduly hamper
first amendment freedoms.203
In two later decisions, the Court ruled that public employees could not be
discharged solely for their political affiliations or beliefs, at least so long as the
employees were not policymakers or serving in confidential capacities. 0 " These
rulings are based on the policy that a public employee cannot be discharged for
exercising constitutionally guaranteed rights without a showing of a government
interest which outweighs those rights. 5 While the Branti and Elrod decisions are
apparently limited to those cases where an employee has taken no overt action based
upon his or her political associations or beliefs, both decisions are replete with
language which emphasizes the primacy of first amendment rights. In Elrod, the
196 Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967).
'97 Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
199 Id.
199 Id. at 569-70.
200 Id. at 573.
201 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
202 Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 598-99.
203 Id. at 599.
204 Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980). Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
210 Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
1984]
23
Crittenden: Restrictions on Political Activities of Government Employees
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1984
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
Court observed that "a significant impairment of First Amendment rights must
survive exacting scrutiny." 2 The government must prove both that there is a para-




It is difficult to explain why the Supreme Court continues to uphold the broad
proscriptions of the Hatch Act and similar statutes. The "exacting scrutiny" sup-
posedly utilized to examine infringements of first amendment rights seems to break
down when applied to these statutes. The Court is unusually deferential to con-
gressional findings of state interest and, indeed, sometimes supplies possible justifica-
tions for legislative action. The thousands of Civil Service Commission rulings which
determine the actual prohibited or permitted activities are found not to be so con-
fusing as to establish unconstitutional vagueness, despite significant evidence to
the contrary. The statutes' coverage of millions of employees is not found to be
prohibitively broad or in violation of the rule requiring utilization of the least restric-
tive alternative to meet the state's compelling interest, even though all types of
employees are covered with the same suffocating blanket: administrative worker
or laborer, policymaker or functionary, government employee or employee of a
covered nonprofit organization.
Nevertheless, there is no indication that the Court will soon reexamine these
restrictive statutes. Unless Congress is able to effectuate significant legislative reform,*
a substantial portion of the citizenry of this nation will remain at least partially
disenfranchised for the foreseeable future. The enactment of legislation similar to
that proposed in the Federal Employees' Political Activities Act of 1976 would
be a major step toward correcting a long-standing injustice.
Elizabeth L. Crittenden
206 Elrod, 427 U.S. at 362.
207 Id. at 362-63.
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